December 19, 2019 Florida Supreme Court opinions

We cover six opinions from the curtailed court in Tallahassee today. A new record for the blog. As a result, however, I was not able to go as in-depth on some of them as I would have liked. I’ll be adding some analysis when I get the chance, so check back. Quite a few retreats from precedent today—the beginning of a trend?

Stand Your Ground

Does the legislature’s 2017 amendment to Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law, which altered the burden of proof at pretrial immunity hearings, apply to pending cases in which the alleged criminal conduct occurred before the amendment’s effective date? That’s the question answered by the Florida Supreme Court today in its opinion in Love v. State.

In passing the Stand Your Ground law in 2005, the legislature granted immunity from prosecution for the justifiable use of force in self-defense in specified circumstances, but little was spelled out in the way of procedure. In 2010 the Florida Supreme Court found that the law required a pretrial immunity hearing, and in 2015 it held that at this hearing a defendant bore the burden of proof to demonstrate immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. In response, in 2017, the legislature amended the law to provide that at the pretrial immunity hearing, once a prima facie claim of self-defense was raised, the State bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to show that the defendant was not immune from prosecution.

The district courts have split on whether this amendment was procedural or substantive, the practical consequence being either retroactive or prospective application. The general rule is that substantive laws, which involve vested rights or duties, can only be applied prospectively, while procedural laws, which involve merely the “means and methods” of protecting or enforcing those rights or duties, can have retroactive application, including in pending cases and cases on appeal. In the below case, for example, the Third District found that the amendment was substantive, as it created a new legal right by imposing a new legal burden on the State. But the Third District certified conflict with the Second District’s decision in Martin v. State, coming to the opposite conclusion and noting that statutory changes to burdens of proof are “invariably deemed procedural.” Thus the court found that the statute applied retroactively, including to cases pending on appeal, and therefore remanded for a pretrial hearing under the new standard.

Today the Florida Supreme Court sides with the Second District on the procedural vs. substantive issue, ruling that the statute was procedural because it “did not withdraw or interfere” with the substantive right to immunity, which was created when the Stand Your Ground law passed in 2005, but “merely altered ‘the method of conducting litigation involving’ that right.” But the Court disagrees with the Second District’s ruling on retroactivity. Admitting that its own rulings on the issue ‘have not been entirely consistent,” the court attempts to clarify its previous jurisprudence by reasoning that the retroactive application of procedural statutes does not simply turn on “the date of the events giving rise to the case,” but instead depends on the posture of the case.

In this case, the amendment would be considered retroactive not if it applied to pending cases involving conduct that occurred before the amendment passed, but only if it “attach[ed] new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” However, the court reasons, simply because a rule is procedural does not mean that it should apply to all pending cases, including cases on appeal.

To resolve these issues, the Florida Supreme Court adopts the U.S. Supreme Court’s “commonsense” notion of application of new procedural laws, which provides that new procedural rules generally apply to pending cases, but only to the application of those rules that occur after the effective date of the statute. Thus, a new procedural rule will generally not require appellate remand for new trial. In other words, although the Stand Your Ground amendment is procedural and applies to pending cases arising from conduct that predated the amendment, in effect the procedural application is actually prospective. In applying this “ordinary” and “commonsense” approach, the Florida Supreme Court disapproves of the Second District’s “true retroactive application” of the procedural statute, which resulted in an order for a new pretrial immunity hearing.

In synthesizing criminal and civil cases involving the procedural/substantive distinction, and in adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s “commonsense” approach to the matter from a civil case, Love v. State is now the go-to case for determining whether a statute has substantively prospective application (does not apply in pending cases), procedurally prospective application (applies in pending cases, but only involving procedure occurring after the effective date), or truly retroactive application (applies in pending cases involving conduct or procedure that predates the effective date).

Statutory Causes of Action

In today’s short opinion in Lieupo v. Simon’s Trucking, Inc., the court agrees with the First District’s ruling that under supreme court precedent Florida’s 1983 Water Quality Assurance Act did not permit recovery for personal injuries. But the court, in one of its many retreats from its prior jurisprudence today, recedes from that precedent and quashes the First District’s decision.

In a previous case, the court had held that a restrictive definition of “damages” found in the 1970 Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, specifically excluding damage to human beings, barred recovery for personal damages in cases brought under the 1983 act in the same chapter. But today the court receded from that decision, finding that under a plain reading of the statute the restrictive damages application applies only to the 1970 act, which was intended to protect coastal waters, and not to the 1983 act, which created a cause of action for humans harmed by water pollution.

Although Lieupo had filed a cause of action under the 1983 act, the First District correctly found that supreme court precedent broadly applying the 1970 act’s definition of damages barred his claim. In receding from its precedent, the supreme court found that the majority in that case had simply applied the incorrect definition, in contradiction to the express will of the legislature.

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

The Florida Supreme Court answers a narrow question in American Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Lentini: under reduced-premium policies on collector vehicles, can insurers limit uninsured motorist coverage to accidents involving occupancy or use of the insured collector vehicle? The court rules today that the UIM statute prohibits this limitation.

After Lentini was involved in a fatal motorcycle accident, his estate sought UIM benefits from an insurance policy issued on a separate collector vehicle, his 1992 Corvette. The reduced-premium policy limited coverage to accidents involving that vehicle, so the insurance company denied the claim, and the estate sued.

The UIM statute provides that motor vehicle insurance policies cannot be issued without UIM coverage unless it is expressly rejected in writing by the insured. The statute has been broadly interpreted to provide coverage even when the insured is not operating the insured vehicle, or any motor vehicle, and the statute only allows for limited restrictions on UIM coverage. However, relying on a Second District case that found that the UIM statute did not “specifically mandate coverage for claims unconnected with the insured vehicle,” the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company.

On appeal, the Fifth District disagreed with the Second and certified conflict, finding no evidence in the UIM statute of an intent to exclude collector or antique vehicles. Moreover, the policy limitation did not fit within any of the allowable limitations in the UIM statute. The Florida Supreme Court agreed, finding that the limiting language in the policy violated the statute, which requires coverage for claims “unconnected with the insured vehicle.”

Jury Instructions

Do unobjected-to improper jury instructions as to a lesser-included offense one step removed from the charged offense amount to fundamental error, even if the evidence supported the defendant’s conviction on the charged count? Until recently, the answer would have been ‘yes.’ But today, in Knight v. State, the Florida Supreme Court recedes from its prior jurisprudence and rules that a defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated when the jury is possibly denied an opportunity to convict on a lesser-included offense.

The court found that in its earlier cases it had impermissibly transformed a “power of the jury” to pardon into a “right of the defendant,” the deprivation of which resulted in reversible error even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. But because fundamental error requires a finding that the verdict could not have been reached without the error, the court reasoned, a conviction supported by the evidence cannot result in fundamental error even in light of improper instructions on lesser-included offenses. As for stare decisis, the majority found that the doctrine was “not unwavering,” and that the court maintained its right to recede from past precedent that was “clearly erroneous.”

While the majority frames the issue as a retreat from the improper elevation of the jury’s power to pardon, Justice Labarga in a strong dissent considers the issue in terms of the jury’s ability to convict of the correct crime. He argues that because charged offenses and lesser-included offenses are distinguished solely by their elements, improper instructions on lesser-included offenses “impair the jury’s ability to distinguish one offense from another.” As for fundamental error, Justice Labarga notes that the proper analysis requires consideration of the error’s effect on the verdict—meaning, could the jury convict of the lesser-included offense had it been properly instructed? If the jury is not properly instructed on the lesser-included offense, it is indeterminable whether it would have convicted on that offense—thus, fundamental error. Justice Labarga also took issue with the majority’s retreat from “longstanding precedent.”

Speedy Trial

Florida’s speedy trial rule requires the State to bring felony charges within 175 days of an arrest, meaning arrested “for the purpose of being ‘held to answer’ in court for specified criminal charges.” But how is that determined, for purposes of the rule? For a long time, courts have applied the “Melton test,” based on the Florida Supreme Court’s listing of several factors to consider in that case:

A purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) An actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by a person having present power to control the person arrested; (3) A communication by the arresting officer to the person whose arrest is sought, of an intention or purpose then and there to effect an arrest; and (4) An understanding by the person whose arrest is sought that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him.

Melton v. State.

However, in Davis v. State, the Fifth District Court asked the supreme court to reconsider its use of this complicated test.

As it turns out, not only does the Florida Supreme Court agree that the test is overly complicated, it also expresses concern that the test could result in an arrest for speedy trial purposes despite the fact that a defendant has not been arrested for the purpose of being “held to answer” for specific crimes—in other words, the Melton test may fail to accurately determine whether someone has been arrested for speedy trial purposes, resulting in the procedural equivalent of “false positives.”

Nevertheless, the court has declined to reconsider its adherence to the Melton test, instead punting the issue to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee to reevaluate the speedy trial rule. Until that happens, the Melton test is in effect.

Faretta inquiry

Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as established in Faretta, a defendant’s waiver of appointed counsel must be made “knowingly and intelligently.” For many years, the Florida Supreme Court avoided requiring that a trial court ask any specific questions in making this determination. But two recent cases called that approach into question, when they adopted a rule that in a Faretta inquiry a trial court “must inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.”

The Florida Supreme Court today in Hooks v. State recedes from those cases and returns to its prior approach, ruling that a Faretta inquiry is still valid even if the trial court fails to “inquire as to the defendant’s age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure.” While the trial court should hold a “thorough inquiry” to determine whether the accused has the capacity to “make a knowing and intelligent waiver,” this inquiry does not necessitate asking any specific questions. In so reasoning, the court found that its prior cases creating categorical rules as to specific questions were anomalous, unsupported by prior case about law, and in conflict with the rules of criminal procedure.